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To combat terrorism, Attorney General John
Ashcroft has asked Congress to “enhance” the
government’s ability to conduct domestic surveil-
lance of citizens. The Justice Department’s leg-
islative proposals would give federal law enforce-
ment agents new access to personal information
contained in business and school records. Before
acting on those legislative proposals, lawmakers
should pause to consider the extent to which the
lives of ordinary Americans already are moni-
tored by the federal government.
Over the years, the federal government has
instituted a variety of data collection programs
that compel the production, retention, and dis-
semination of personal information about every
American citizen. Linked through an individ-
ual’s Social Security number, these labor, med-
ical, education and financial databases now
empower the federal government to obtain a
detailed portrait of any person: the checks he
writes, the types of causes he supports, and what
he says “privately” to his doctor. Despite wide-
spread public concern about preserving privacy,
these data collection systems have been enacted
in the name of “reducing fraud” and “promot-
ing efficiency” in various government programs.
Having exposed most areas of American life
to ongoing government scrutiny and recording,
Congress is now poised to expand and univer-
salize federal tracking of citizen life. The
inevitable consequence of such constant surveil-
lance, however, is metastasizing government
control over society. If that happens, our gov-
ernment will have perverted its most fundamen-
tal mission and destroyed the privacy and liber-
ty that it was supposed to protect.
October 17, 2001
When a large part of the information
about economic statistics or administra-
tive arrangements is collected and issued
by the government, investigators and
critics are forced to approach the very
officials they may criticise for the infor-
mation that might give substance to
their criticisms.
H. B. Acton (1971)1
Dependency’s Forgotten
Vector: Government-
Compelled Information
Imagine for a moment a nation whose
central government mandated ongoing col-
lection of detailed personal information—
individually identified—recording each citi-
zen’s employment, income, childhood and
subsequent educational experiences, medical
history (including doctors’ subjective impres-
sions), financial transactions (including
copies of personal checks written), ancestry,
living conditions (including bathroom,
kitchen, and bedroom facilities), rent or
mortgage payments, household expenses,
roommates and their characteristics, in-
home telephone service, automobile owner-
ship, household heating and sewage systems,
number of stillbirths, language capability—
and periodically even demanded to know
what time each person in the household usu-
ally left home to go to work during the previ-
ous week. Imagine further that such a gov-
ernment assigned every citizen a central gov-
ernment identification number at birth and
mandated its use in reporting the informa-
tion listed above. Suppose the same govern-
ment were actively considering mandatory
nationwide use of a “biometric identifier,”
such as fingerprints or retinal scans, along
with a new counterfeit-proof permanent gov-
ernment identification card incorporating
the individual’s government-issued number
and other personal information, encoded in
magnetic strips and embedded computer
chips capable of holding up to 1,600 pages of
information about the individual. If a con-
temporary novelist were to portray the emer-
gence of such a government in America, his
novel undoubtedly would be regarded as
futuristic fiction, in the same vein as George
Orwell’s 1984.
Yet this national portrait is no longer fic-
tion. The foregoing description is of a gov-
ernment that now wields exactly those omi-
nous powers over the citizenry: America’s
federal government at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. The logical outgrowth
of such all-encompassing federal collection
of personal information is increased govern-
ment power and concomitant individual
dependence on government. Altered political
transaction costs again have supplied the
means, with the information-collection
authority described in this chapter emerging
both as a product and instrument of transac-
tion-cost manipulation. 
Governments long have recognized infor-
mation collection’s capacity to erode individ-
ual autonomy by fostering deep personal
uncertainty about the uses to which the
information will be put. Law professor Paul
Schwartz described this linkage clearly:
Personal information can be shared to
develop a basis for trust, but the manda-
tory disclosure of personal information
can have a destructive effect on human
independence. . . . Totalitarian regimes
have already demonstrated the fragility
of the human capacity for autonomy.
The effectiveness of these regimes in ren-
dering adults as helpless as children is in
large part a product of the uncertainty
that they instill regarding their use of
personal information.2
With respect to U.S. government data collec-
tion in the 1990s, he added: “Americans no
longer know how their personal information
will be applied, who will gain access to it, and
what decisions will be made with it. The
resulting uncertainty increases pressure for
conformity. Individuals whose personal data
are shared, processed and stored by a myste-
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rious, incalculable bureaucracy will be more
likely to act as the government wishes them
to behave.” With extensive federal data col-
lection creating ever greater incentives to
behave as government wishes us to behave,
the result is metastasizing government con-
trol. Indeed, Schwartz viewed the computer’s
ability to digitize personal information as
offering “the state and society a powerful way
to control the behavior of individuals.”3 The
result—and often the purpose—is a profound
erosion of individual autonomy.
This chapter focuses on existing central
government data-collection programs that
share one defining characteristic: they com-
pel production, retention, and dissemination
of personal information about every
American citizen.4 Their target is ordinary
American citizens carrying out ordinary day
to-day activities of life. Although these pro-
grams by no means constitute the whole uni-
verse of federal data-collection activity, today
they are the government’s most critical infor-
mational levers for institutionalizing govern-
ment control, individual dependence, and
unprecedented threats to cherished
American liberties. Even within this circum-
scribed sphere, the immense volume of feder-
al data collection defies brief summary.
Accordingly, this chapter highlights the
development and recent expansion of
• Databases keyed to Social Security numbers—
examining unchecked use of Social
Security numbers as a fulcrum for gov-
ernment data collection about individu-
als, and probing current legislative
efforts to establish a national identifica-
tion card; 
• Labor databases—analyzing statutory pro-
visions aimed at building a federal data-
base of all American workers and requir-
ing employers to obtain the central gov-
ernment’s approval before hiring
employees;
• Medical databases—assessing creation of a
“unique health identifier” and imple-
mentation of uniform electronic data-
bases of personal medical information
nationwide as mandated by the 1996
Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA);
• Education databases—revealing federal
databases mandated by Goals 2000 and
related 1994 education acts that estab-
lish detailed national records of chil-
dren’s educational experiences and
socioeconomic status; and
• Financial databases—describing provi-
sions of federal statutory law requiring
banks and other financial institutions to
create permanent, readily retrievable
records of each individual’s checks,
deposits, and other financial activities.
These databases, linked by individuals’ Social
Security numbers, now empower the federal
government to obtain an astonishingly
detailed portrait of any person in America,
including the checks he writes, the types of
causes he supports, and even what he says
“privately” to his doctor.
Of course, federal officials always provide
an appealing reason for such governmental
intrusion into our private lives, however
inadequate the reason or unconstitutional
the intrusion. As we have seen, they pre-
dictably use political transaction-cost manip-
ulation in their effort to minimize resistance,
increasing the transaction costs to private
individuals of perceiving—and taking collec-
tive action to resist—governmental encroach-
ments. There is always an asserted benefit to
be obtained, a plausible cover story. 
The ostensible reasons have been diverse.
We have been told that government-mandated
use of Social Security numbers in electronic
databases will help to “reduce fraud”—tax
fraud, welfare fraud, the usual litany. We have
been told that requiring businesses to contact
the government for approval before hiring
anyone will help in “cracking down on illegal
immigration.” We have been told that forcing
private physicians to record what we say to
them in confidence will “reduce health care
fraud,” promote “efficiency,” allow “better
emergency treatment,” make it “easier for the
patient” to keep track of his medical records,
3
There is always
an asserted bene-
fit to be obtained,
a plausible cover
story.
and the like. We have been told that govern-
ment tracking of what public school teachers
record concerning our children will assist in
students’ selection of a “career major,”
enhance assessment of school courses, and
facilitate identification of students needing
help. We have been told that government
requirements that banks keep microfilm
copies of all the checks we write will “reduce
white-collar crime” and “inhibit money laun-
dering.” Who could oppose such worthy goals
unless he has something to hide? 
The immense powers now exercised by the
federal government have made these ration-
ales inevitable. Having empowered the feder-
al government to exert centralized control
over far-flung human endeavors, most
Americans want government officials to
administer the programs effectively and
responsibly. But doing so necessitates
“reducing fraud” and “promoting efficiency”
in the programs, legitimate objectives that
often become chameleonic rationales that
ultimately are invoked in the service of ille-
gitimate ends. The pattern is unmistakable:
with vast federal power comes vast federal
surveillance, providing plausible cover for
those seeking to further extend the central
government’s purview.
Political transaction-cost manipulation
has framed the issue in other ways besides
these appealing rationales. Indeed, the back-
drop for this chapter’s discussion is the ubiq-
uitous political transaction-cost manipula-
tion, described in earlier chapters, that facili-
tated passage of the statutes that originally
authorized and gave rise to this data collec-
tion: the Social Security Act, the health care
legislation, the education statutes, and the
like. That history will not be repeated here.
Instead, this chapter provides additional
examples of political transaction-cost manip-
ulation specifically involving the data collec-
tion aspects of those laws, focusing on their
use to support the central government’s
accelerating quest for detailed personal data
about each and every American citizen. 
In some cases discussed below, the data-
base maneuvers were deliberately obscured
from public view, buried in what writer Claire
Wolfe called “land-mine legislation” that
people don’t notice until they step on it.5 In
other cases Americans were encouraged to
view new proposals piecemeal, a strategy that
forestalled public perception of the conflu-
ent streams of nationwide government-man-
dated data centralization and their likely
eventual result. Incrementalism again served
activist policymaking. Information-law
scholar Simon Davies judged the public’s
“greater acceptance of privacy-invasive
schemes” in recent years to be in part a result
of “[p]roposals . . . being brought forward in
a more careful and piecemeal fashion,” which
may be “lulling the public into a false sense of
security.”6
Given that piecemeal progression, legisla-
tors and members of the popular press today
seldom discuss the likely cost of government
data centralization in terms of lost liberty.
Perhaps “liberty” does not resonate so
strongly or create as powerful an image for
most people as “cracking down on illegal
immigration” or “reducing health care
fraud.” Liberty, after all, is an abstraction
whose concrete reality often is not appreciat-
ed until its opposite is experienced firsthand.
Yet we ignore at our peril the long-cited “use
of personal information systems by Nazi
Germany to enable the identification and
location of a target race.”7 Race-based gov-
ernment roundups of law-abiding citizens
also occurred in America less than sixty years
ago, similarly facilitated by government data
collection. As Cato Institute policy analyst
Solveig Singleton and others have reported,
“In the U.S., census data were used to find
Japanese-Americans and force them into
camps,”8 a historical reality that gives fresh
meaning to a 1990 U.S. Census instruction
stating that “It is as important to get infor-
mation about people and their houses as it is
to count them.”9 By 2002, however, events of
the 1940s have become only a “vague memo-
ry”—and, except for the elderly, not a living
memory at all.1 0
So today Congress proceeds apace.
Having exposed most areas of our lives to
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ongoing government scrutiny and recording,
Congress now is working to expand and uni-
versalize federal tracking of law-abiding citi-
zens’ private lives. Concurrently, new devel-
opments in biometry are producing tech-
nologies that most observers concede
“imperil individual autonomy” and pose
“real threats to the fabric of contemporary
society.”1 1The next generation awaits the full
flowering of these technologies and their
availability to governments. Our privacy, our
personal identity, our independence, and our
freedom hang in the balance.
Linking Personal Records:
A “De Facto National
Identification Number”1 2
The Social Security number (SSN) has
become a key to detailed government knowl-
edge of our private lives. Even the secretary of
the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) has described American
Social Security numbers as a “de facto person-
al identifier.”13 Kristin Davis, senior associate
editor of Kiplinger’s Personal Finance Magazine,
described “the growing use of social security
numbers as an all-purpose ID” as the “single
biggest threat to protecting our financial
identities.”1 4 Since the Social Security pro-
gram’s inception in the 1930s, when officials
slighted public fears that identification of
citizens for Social Security purposes implied
regimentation, that reality has relentlessly
emerged. 
Federal officials long denied that SSNs
would function as national identification
numbers. They were supposed to be mere
“account numbers” denoting an individual’s
“old-age insurance account” in which his
“contributions” were set aside in a federal
“trust fund” for his retirement. But expan-
sion of SSN use came quickly, much of it
ordered by the federal government. President
Franklin Roosevelt began the process in 1943
by ordering that thereafter, whenever the
head of any federal department or agency
found “it advisable to establish a new system
of permanent account numbers pertaining
to individual persons,” the department or
agency “shall . . . utilize exclusively the Social
Security Act account numbers” assigned pur-
suant to that act.1 5
The full impact of Roosevelt’s order was
not felt until computers became available.
Gradual computerization made SSN-based
record systems increasingly appealing
throughout the 1960s. In 1961 the Civil
Service Commission first ordered the use of
SSNs to identify all federal employees. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began using
SSNs as taxpayer identification numbers in
1962. Department of Defense military per-
sonal records were identified by SSN begin-
ning in 1967; the SSN became the Medicare
identifier in the 1960s. Thereafter SSN use
spread unabated:
By the 1970s, the SSN floodgates had
opened fully. Congress in 1972 amend-
ed the Social Security Act to require the
use of SSNs for identifying legally-
admitted aliens and anyone applying
for federal benefits. In following years,
additional legislation required the SSN
for the identification of those eligible to
receive Medicaid, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (“AFDC”) bene-
fits, food stamps, school lunch pro-
gram benefits, and federal loans.1 6
Moreover, the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act, dis-
cussed later in this chapter, required all
financial institutions to identify customers
by SSN and preserve detailed records of their
customers’ personal checks and other finan-
cial transactions. 
The Privacy Act of 1974 did not stop the
flood.1 7Although it purported to restrict fed-
eral dissemination of SSNs, it not only
exempted existing federal SSN use that had
been previously authorized by statute or reg-
ulation but also created a massive exemption
allowing disclosure of personal information
obtained by federal officials if the disclosure
involved a “routine use” of the data. Two
years later, utterly countermanding any
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notion of restricting SSN use and dissemina-
tion, Congress included in the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 a provision that gave states free
rein to use SSNs. It stated:
It is the policy of the United States that
any State (or political subdivision there-
of) may, in the administration of any
tax, general public assistance, driver’s
license, or motor vehicle registration
law within its jurisdiction, utilize the
social security account numbers issued
by the Secretary for the purpose of
establishing the identification of indi-
viduals affected by such law, and may
require any individual who is or appears
to be so affected to furnish to such
State (or political subdivision thereof)
or any agency thereof having adminis-
trative responsibility for the law
involved, the social security account
number . . . issued to him by the
Secretary.18
Incrementalist policies continued to
advance SSN use, as illustrated by the grad-
ual introduction of requirements that Social
Security numbers be obtained for young chil-
dren. For approximately the first fifty years of
the Social Security program, one did not
acquire an SSN until beginning one’s first
job, usually around age sixteen. Today every
child must acquire an SSN at birth or short-
ly thereafter. How did policymakers accom-
plish such a radical change? Much as one
conditions dogs: a bit at a time—and always
with a reward attached. First, Congress
required in 1986 that every child claimed as a
dependent on federal tax forms have an SSN
by age five. Then in 1988 they reduced it to
age two. Then in 1990 they reduced it to age
one. Finally, in 1996, they passed a global
requirement that an SSN must be presented
for anyone of any age claimed as a dependent
on any federal tax form. No SSN, no federal
tax deduction.1 9In general, to obtain any fed-
eral benefit today, tax-related or otherwise,
one must present the Social Security num-
bers of all parties affected.2 0 To facilitate
assignment of SSNs at birth, the federal gov-
ernment has financed state “Enumeration at
Birth” programs to secure issuance of the
numbers as a routine part of birth certificate
registration, a process that is now opera-
tional in all fifty states.
A coordinated government effort now
under way to require even greater use of SSNs
will further centralize federal monitoring of
all American citizens. Its elements include
• federal mandates attempting to regulate
state drivers’ licenses and birth certifi-
cates;
• federal “work authorization” databases
covering all working Americans and
keyed to SSNs;
• federal development of a “unique health
identifier” for each American in imple-
menting uniform electronic databases
of private medical histories;
• federal implementation of education
databases; and
• federal development and issuance of
new “tamper resistant” Social Security
cards, perhaps with biometric identi-
fiers, viewed by many as precursor of the
long-feared “national identity card.”
The education, medical history, and work
authorization databases are discussed sepa-
rately below. First I shall discuss the driver’s
license, birth certificate, and tamper-resistant
Social Security card provisions.
In 1997 an unprecedented federal asser-
tion of control over state-issued drivers’
licenses tested the limits of public tolerance
for expanding federal control over tradition-
al state functions. Although this particular
statutory language was repealed two years
later, similar provisions linger, and the
episode highlights both the direction of cur-
rent congressional efforts and how the game
is being played. 
The provision was buried in an omnibus
bill, the 749-page Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 1997, which included
the “Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996” (the
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“Immigration Reform Act”) that contained the
relevant language.2 1 The key provisions began
on page 716, sandwiched between a section
entitled “Sense of Congress on Discriminatory
Application of New Brunswick Provincial Sales
Tax” and another entitled “Border Patrol
Museum.” So well concealed, the provisions
were difficult to spot even if you already knew
they were there.
Section 656(b) of the Immigration
Reform Act dealt with “State-Issued Drivers
Licenses and Comparable Identification
Documents.” The language made compli-
ance with federal rules specifying characteris-
tics for these documents mandatory without
actually saying so. It simply prohibited feder-
al agencies from accepting a state-issued dri-
ver’s license for identification purposes
unless it satisfied federal requirements.
Instead of telling the states “you must,” it
made it nearly impossible for state residents
to interact with the federal government if the
state did not comply. This charade of volun-
tariness was buttressed by hard cash—grants
to states “to assist them in issuing driver’s
licenses and other comparable identification
documents that satisfy the requirements”
issued by the federal government.
Compliance required the states to follow
federal Department of Transportation (DOT)
regulations specifying both the form of the dri-
ver’s license and federally acceptable “evidence
of identity” in issuing the license. Raising the
specter of biometric identifiers, it required
“security features” intended to “limit tamper-
ing, counterfeiting, photocopying, or otherwise
duplicating, the license or document for fraud-
ulent purposes and to limit use of the license or
document by impostors.” In addition, the
statute mandated that in general the driver’s
license or other identification document had to
include a social security account number “that
can be read visually or by electronic means.”
States could avoid including the SSN on the
license only by requiring “every applicant for a
driver’s license . . . to submit the applicant’s
social security account number” and
“verify[ing] with the Social Security
Administration that such account number is
valid.” Either way, the SSN was readily at
hand—and easily cross-linked electronically to
any alternative identifier a state might adopt.
Proposed federal DOT rules implementing
these provisions were published in 1998.22
But section 656(b) was short lived. On
October 9, 1999, Congress passed a lengthy
appropriations bill covering appropriations
for the DOT and related agencies. The forty-
second page of that legislation contained a
single sentence, with no heading or other
explanation, that stated in its entirety: “Sec.
355. Section 656(b) of division C of the
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 1997 is repealed.”2 3 Section 656(b) thus
perished through the same transaction-cost
manipulating strategies that had enabled its
passage in 1997. Like other incrementally
installed federal controls, however, it will no
doubt rise again. And, as shown in the next
section’s discussion of the new-hire legisla-
tion, a similar driver’s license measure
appeared elsewhere in the Immigration
Reform Act.
The other prong of current federal efforts
to control state-issued identification docu-
ments entails regulation of the states’
issuance of birth certificates. Enacted into
law as sec. 656(a) of the same 1996
Immigration Reform Act, it has not been
repealed. The tactic was the same, requiring
that federal agencies could not accept birth
certificates for official purposes unless the
birth certificate complied with federal regula-
tions specifying “appropriate standards for
birth certificates.”2 4 Bribes followed in the
form of grants to states to help them issue
birth certificates that “conform to the stan-
dards” in the federal regulation. Federal
grants also were authorized for states to help
them develop the “capability to match birth
and death records” and to finance related
demonstration projects. An explicit objective
was to “note the fact of death on the birth
certificates of deceased persons.” However
fleeting, the sole federal concession was to
“not require a single design” for birth certifi-
cates in all states and to allow state differ-
ences in the “manner and form” of storing
7
Federal agencies
could not accept
birth certificates
for official pur-
poses unless the
birth certificate
complied with
federal regula-
tions.
birth records and producing birth certifi-
cates. The substance was another matter.
Perhaps the most ominous of Congress’s
innocuously titled “Improvements in
Identification-Related Documents” required
development of “prototypes” of a “counterfeit-
resistant Social Security card.”2 5 Congress
specifically mandated that the prototype card
“shall employ technologies that provide securi-
ty features, such as magnetic stripes, holo-
grams, and integrated circuits.” Integrated cir-
cuits? Integrated circuits open the door to bio-
metric identifiers and the storage of vast
amounts of personal data on each person’s gov-
ernment-required Social Security card, a theme
that recurred in government discussions of the
“unique health identifier” for medical records.2 6
And they are not just aiming these changes at
new people entering the Social Security system.
The statute required the Social Security com-
missioner and the comptroller general to study
the “cost and work load implications of issuing
a counterfeit-resistant social security card for all
individuals over a 3, 5, and 10 year period.”2 7
These new cards “shall be developed so as to
provide individuals with reliable proof of citi-
zenship or legal alien status.” Proof of citizen-
ship? Federal officials have claimed that such a
document is not a “national identification
card” because—note well—we will not be
required to carry it around with us at all times.2 8
Not yet, anyway. 
Despite all such protestations, the SSN is
now at the heart of a vast array of govern-
ment databases, and linkage of those sepa-
rate databases occurs regularly despite peri-
odic statutory lip service to individual priva-
cy. It is all perfectly legal under the 1988
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection
Act discussed later in this chapter.
Privacilla.org reported in March 2001 that
agencies covered by the act listed forty-seven
such exchanges “from September 1999 to
February 2001” alone, meaning that a “feder-
al government agency quietly announce[d] a
new plan to exchange and merge databases of
personal information about American citi-
zens” more frequently than “once every other
week.”2 9 Among the listed data-sharing
transactions were exchanges of personal
information about all of us between
• The IRS and the Social Security
Administration (SSA);
• The SSA and the Health Care Financing
Administration;
• The Postal Service and the Department
of Labor;
• The Justice Department and the
Department of Veterans Affairs;
• The IRS and state social services agen-
cies;
• The Department of Education and
HHS; and
• The SSA and the state courts.3 0
These data mergers and exchanges are not
aberrations, and they are not limited to infor-
mation about suspected criminals: they are a
systematic policy tool of today’s federal gov-
ernment, extending far beyond the agencies
covered by the Computer Matching and
Privacy Protection Act.31
Consider exchanges involving the Social
Security Administration (SSA). Its own regu-
lations state that SSA officials “disclose
information when a law specifically requires
it,” including: 
disclosures to the SSA Office of
Inspector General, the Federal Parent
Locator Service, and to States pursuant
to an arrangement regarding use of the
Blood Donor Locator Service. Also,
there are other laws which require that
we furnish other agencies information
which they need for their programs.
These agencies include the Department
of Veterans Affairs . . . , the Immigration
and Naturalization Service . . . , the
Railroad Retirement Board . . . , and to
Federal, State, and local agencies
administering Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, Medicaid, unem-
ployment compensation, food stamps,
and other programs.3 2
And, of course, the IRS. “Information” is
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defined to mean “information about an indi-
vidual” which “includes, but is not limited
to”:
vital statistics; race, sex, or other physical
characteristics; earnings information;
professional fees paid to an individual
and other financial information; benefit
data or other claims information; the
social security number, employer identi-
fication number, or other individual
identifier; address; phone number; med-
ical information, including psychologi-
cal or psychiatric information or lay
information used in a medical determi-
nation; and information about marital
and family relationships and other per-
sonal relationships.33
Even without the SSA’s much reviled on-line
dissemination in 1997 of the agency’s data-
base of “Personal Earnings and Benefit
Estimate Statement” information on
Americans, making the data electronically
accessible via the Internet to third parties
without the subject individual’s knowledge
or consent, the SSA’s broad regulatory power
to transmit personal information to other
government agencies seriously compromises
individual privacy.
Concrete examples of the data linkages
across government agencies are provided by
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program—now called Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)—and
the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) pro-
gram. In describing the effects of computeri-
zation of federal records, law professor Paul
Schwartz stated that “AFDC has progressed
from midnight searches of the welfare bene-
ficiary’s home to continuous searches of the
beneficiary’s personal data.” Explaining “the
enormous amount of information to which
AFDC offices have access” and the “extensive
data bases that are manipulated in adminis-
tering the AFDC program,” Schwartz added:
From the Social Security Administra-
tion, AFDC receives access to the BEN-
DEX [Beneficiary Data System] and
SDX [Medicare eligibility and
Supplemental Security Income pay-
ment] data systems. From the Internal
Revenue Service, AFDC receives data
relating to the tax interception and par-
ent locator programs. Within state gov-
ernment, AFDC receives information
from the Employment Security Division
(worker’s compensation and employ-
ment) and the Child Support
Enforcement Unit (child support pay-
ments). AFDC offices also receive infor-
mation about unemployment payments
from other states.3 4
Over time the program’s broad reach pre-
dictably has spawned increasingly intrusive
data collection and data sharing in the name
of curtailing welfare fraud.
A similar pattern is evident in the federal
Child Support Enforcement program. As
Schwartz has recounted, after the program’s
creation in 1974, parent locator services in
every state were granted access to ever more
government databases of personal informa-
tion. Their use of the SSN passkey was
authorized in 1976, when “Congress explicit-
ly authorized the use of social security num-
bers in searches of federal and state data
banks for information leading to the loca-
tion of these delinquent parents of AFDC
families.”3 5Thereafter Congress gave the par-
ent locator services access to IRS records and
extended the data matching program to all
families, making even non-AFDC families
subject to “data matching and tax intercep-
tion with the IRS.” Schwartz quoted a state
director of CSE as saying, “Some people
would say that’s Big Brotherism. Well, it is.”3 6
Every child support enforcement unit
(CSEU) has access to all the AFDC data listed
above as well as to the Federal Parent Locator
database. That database in turn contains
information from “the Social Security
Administration; the Department of Defense;
the Veterans Administration; the Motor
Vehicle Bureau of the state in which the
CSEU is located; the IRS, including 1099
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forms; and commercial credit bureaus. The
parent locator also allows searches of state
data bases, three states at a time.”3 7
Pervasive government extraction of per-
sonal data that are stored and linked via com-
pulsory use of SSNs is today’s reality. As
more and more Americans worry about the
damage that Social Security numbers have
inflicted on our privacy, the federal govern-
ment responded with the Social Security
Number Confidentiality Act of 2000. A reas-
suring title, indeed. But the substance of that
statute only demonstrated the flagrant disre-
gard for American citizens’ privacy that has
characterized federal officials’ actions for
decades. The new statute’s sole purpose was
to instruct the secretary of the treasury
henceforth to “ensure that Social Security
account numbers (including derivatives of
such numbers) are not visible on or through
unopened mailings of checks or other drafts”
issued by the federal government!38
Incrementalism, misrepresentation, hid-
ing threatening measures in larger bills, and
other forms of transaction-cost manipula-
tion have spawned a system of linked federal
databases that now make it virtually impossi-
ble for a person to opt out of, let alone active-
ly resist, the federal government’s monitor-
ing of ordinary, law-abiding American citi-
zens. As we move toward the equivalent of a
national identity card tied to the ubiquitous
SSN, the threat to privacy is clear. Although
it will not be labeled a national identity card,
Stephen Moore of the Cato Institute correct-
ly stated in his testimony on a related bill
that if it “looks like a duck, . . . quacks like a
duck, . . . walks like a duck . . . [i]t’s a duck.”3 9
Tracking (and Preventing)
Your Employment:
“Illegal Aliens” and Other
Excuses
A key aspect of the federal government’s
ongoing effort to establish the equivalent of
a national identity card is its quest to obtain
current, continually updated, detailed elec-
tronic data about where and for whom each
individual in America is working. To over-
come resistance to such federal surveillance,
Congress has used several rationales.
Recurrent excuses for increasing federal sur-
veillance of every working American are
• controlling illegal immigration;
• locating absent parents who owe child
support payments;
• preventing welfare fraud; and
• supporting workforce investment.
These purported rationales have become ritual
incantations; once they are uttered, Congress
expects a mesmerized citizenry to grant what-
ever liberty-curtailing federal powers Congress
demands. So far the strategy has worked.
During the 1990s federal authority to col-
lect labor-related data skyrocketed. The feder-
al government’s desires were particularly evi-
dent in a 1992 amendment to the Job Training
Partnership Act that ordered the commission-
er of labor statistics, cooperating with state
governments, to “determine appropriate pro-
cedures for establishing a nationwide database
containing information on the quarterly earn-
ings, establishment and industry affiliation,
and geographic location of employment, for
all individuals for whom such information is
collected by the States,” including “appropri-
ate procedures for maintaining such informa-
tion in a longitudinal manner.”40
Four years later, further statutory changes
supported these ends. The first was part of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, the 1996 welfare
reform act.41 For the stated purposes of pre-
venting welfare fraud and enforcing child sup-
port obligations, the law established “Directory
of New Hires” electronic databases at both the
state and the national level, simultaneously
authorizing pervasive new data sharing among
federal and state agencies. Despite the law’s wel-
fare motif, neither the state nor national direc-
tories are limited in any way to individuals
receiving public assistance or paying or receiv-
ing child support. Instead, these new databases
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cover every working individual in America who
enters the workforce or changes jobs.4 2
Journalist Robert Pear has called it “one of the
largest, most up-to-date files of personal infor-
mation kept by the government” whose size
and scope “have raised concerns about the
potential for intrusions on privacy.”4 3
The 1996 law specifies that each state
must establish a State Directory of New
Hires that “shall contain information sup-
plied . . . by employers on each newly hired
employee.” Each employer is mandated to
turn over to state officials “a report that con-
tains the name, address, and social security
number of the employee, and the name and
address of, and identifying number assigned
under . . . the Internal Revenue Code [to] the
employer.”4 4 State officials then must give
this information, along with wage and
unemployment data on individuals, to the
federal government for inclusion in its
National Directory of New Hires. As Forbes
writer Brigid McMenamin stated, “The new-
hire legislation is one of dozens of federal
and state laws that force U.S. employers to
moonlight as unpaid police, nannies and tax
collectors.”4 5 Within each state, the State
Directory of New Hires must be matched
against a mandatory “state case registry” con-
taining “standardized data elements for both
parents (such as names, social security num-
bers and other uniform identification num-
bers, dates of birth, and case identification
numbers), and . . . such other information . . .
as the Secretary may require.”4 6
SSNs provide the key link between the
electronic databases. State agencies are
required to “conduct automated compar-
isons of the social security numbers reported
by employers . . . and the social security num-
bers appearing in the records of the State case
registry” to allow state agencies to enforce
child-support obligations by mandatory
wage withholding. States also are ordered to
require SSNs of applicants for any “profes-
sional license, commercial driver’s license,
occupational license, or marriage license”
and to include SSNs on certain court orders
and on death certificates. Broad information
sharing with other state and federal agencies
and with “information comparison services”
is mandated. Access to the new hires data-
base is granted to the secretary of the trea-
sury (IRS), and the SSA is to receive “all infor-
mation” in the national directory. The
statute instructs the secretary of HHS and
the secretary of labor to “work jointly” to
find “efficient methods of accessing the
information” in the state and federal directo-
ries of new hires.4 7
Other major changes in 1996 came via the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996. Although its
most ominous provisions were cast as pilot
programs, their scope and structure clearly
indicated the direction of things to come.
Using the rationale of controlling illegal
immigration, this 1996 statute established
pilot programs requiring employers to seek
the central government’s certification of a
person’s “work authorization” before finaliz-
ing an offer of employment. The manner in
which the federal government’s approval
must be sought substantially overlaps the
pressure for SSN-based national identifica-
tion cards and enhanced SSN-based state dri-
vers’ licenses discussed earlier.
Congress created three “pilot programs
for employment eligibility confirmation”:
the “basic” pilot program, the “citizen attes-
tation” pilot program, and the “machine-
readable-document” pilot program.
Underlying all three was Congress’s mandate
that the U.S. attorney general establish a
pilot “employment eligibility confirmation
system,” keyed to information provided by
the SSA and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). The idea is to
create a federal database capable of confirm-
ing any individual’s SSN and his INS-decreed
work eligibility before an employer finalizes
the hiring of that person. Prior to passage of
the pilot program law, John J. Miller, vice
president of the Center for Equal
Opportunity, and Stephen Moore of the
Cato Institute described such proposals as
follows: “In other words, the government
would, for the first time in history, require
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employers to submit all of their hiring deci-
sions for approval to a federal bureaucrat.”4 8
Although individual firms’ election to partic-
ipate was voluntary, the reward for partici-
pating was protection from both criminal
and civil liability for “any action taken in
good faith reliance on information provided
through the confirmation system.”4 9
The three pilot programs show that a
national identification card system is coming
ever closer. The “basic” program instituted a
system of federal government confirmation
of work eligibility. When hiring, recruiting,
or referring any individual, participating
firms must obtain the potential employee’s
SSN, or INS identification number for aliens,
and require presentation of specified identi-
fication documents. The firms then must use
the government’s “confirmation system” to
get federal approval for the hiring decision.
The statute required that, within three work-
ing days after hiring a person, the employer
“shall make an inquiry . . . using the confir-
mation system to seek confirmation of the
identity and employment eligibility of any
indiviual.”5 1If the firm continues to employ
the individual after a “final nonconfirma-
tion” of work eligibility through the federal
electronic database system, penalties of
$2,000 to $10,000 per unauthorized hire may
be imposed.52
With the citizen attestation pilot pro-
gram, linkages with other parts of the coor-
dinated federal data expansion effort became
apparent. While extending the approach of
the “basic” pilot program, the idea here is to
waive the requirement for work eligibility
confirmation in certain circumstances if the
job applicant claims to be a U.S. citizen—but
only if the state in which a participating firm
is located has adjusted its drivers’ licenses to
include “security” features such as those
described in the previous section. The statu-
tory language is almost identical to that of
the repealed sec. 656(b), requiring each state
driver’s license to contain both a photograph
and “security features” that render it “resis-
tant to counterfeiting, tampering, and fraud-
ulent use.”5 3If a state has complied with the
federally desired format and application
process for state drivers’ licenses, then partic-
ipating firms can avoid mandatory use of the
federal work eligibility confirmation system
by inspecting the job applicant’s state driver’s
license.
The machine-readable-document pilot
program came even closer to a national iden-
tity card approach. For firms to participate in
it, their state must have adopted a driver’s
license format that includes a “machine-
readable social security account number.”
Participating firms then “must make an
inquiry through the confirmation system by
using a machine-readable feature of such
document” to obtain confirmation from the
federal government of the work eligibility of
new employees.5 4 The potential for future
linkage of such procedures to the new skill
certificate programs called for by the 1994
School-to-Work Opportunities Act is all too
evident. 
After establishing the infrastructure for a
national identification card, the 1996
Immigration Reform Act, like other recent
statutes, included a provision headed “No
National Identification Card,” which pro-
claimed that “[n]othing in this subtitle shall
be construed to authorize, directly or indi-
rectly, the issuance or use of national identi-
fication cards or the establishment of a
national identification card.”5 5 Such provi-
sions, appearing ever more frequently in fed-
eral legislation, merely highlight the clear
and present danger of exactly the type of sys-
tem disavowed. Given this brazen political
transaction-cost manipulation, we should
take the advice of the newspaper comic strip
character Cathy, who, after hearing her
mother repeatedly state that she did not
want any popcorn, delighted her mother by
buying her a box of popcorn. Cathy
explained to her astonished boyfriend that in
her family it was important to “pay attention
to the nouns,” not the verbs and adverbs.56 As
Congress repeatedly insists that it has no
interest in national identification cards, we
would be well advised to start paying atten-
tion to the nouns.
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A bill introduced in 1997, H.R. 231,
reflected the continuing congressional pres-
sure to move the nation closer to a national
identification card system. Like the pilot pro-
gram legislation, H.R. 231 prominently dis-
played a provision entitled “Not A National
Identification Card.” Further embracing the
spirit of political transaction-cost manipula-
tion, H.R. 231 was appealingly labeled as a
bill “To improve the integrity of the Social
Security card and to provide for criminal
penalties for fraud and related activity involv-
ing work authorization documents for pur-
poses of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.” Testifying before Congress on this bill,
Stephen Moore described it as a dangerous
extension of pilot work-authorization pro-
grams that had already created “an insidious
national computer registry system with the
federal government centralizing work autho-
rization data on every one of the 120 million
Americans in the workforce.” Moore told the
House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee
on Immigration and Claims:
The centralized computer registry sys-
tem is dangerous enough. But to add to
that a photo i.d. card issued to every cit-
izen that matches up with the comput-
er data base is to put in place the entire
infrastructure of a national i.d. card sys-
tem. All that is missing is the nomen-
clature. As someone once put it: this is
about as ill-fated as giving a teenager a
bottle [of] booze and keys to a motorcy-
cle, but getting him to promise that he
won’t drink and drive. You’re just ask-
ing for trouble.57
We have already asked for trouble. With laws now
on the books, we do have a national ID-card sys-
tem; the real question is how much additional
personal information we will pour into it. 
Vastly more was poured into it in 1998.
The Workforce Investment Act (discussed in
Chapter 5) specifically authorized the secre-
tary of labor to “oversee the development,
maintenance, and continuous improvement
of a nationwide employment statistics sys-
tem” intended to “enumerate, estimate, and
project employment opportunities and con-
ditions at national, State, and local levels in a
timely manner.” Designed to include infor-
mation on all of us and our employment, this
system is to document the “employment and
unemployment status of national, State, and
local populations” and incorporate “employ-
ment and earnings information maintained
in a longitudinal manner.” Despite require-
ments for the data’s “wide dissemination,”
the statute reassured us that this vast array of
information would remain “confidential.”58
Behind nomenclature that continues to con-
ceal more than it reveals to ordinary Americans,
government pressure thus persists for an ever
increasing repository of personal information to
fatten and consolidate national employment
databases and identification systems. It is hard to
disagree with McMenamin’s judgment that
“[t]he endgame is a single system rigged to keep
track of everything about each employee, from
résumé through pension plan, and to calculate
every item to the last penny, and spit out all of the
required reports on schedule.”5 9The Workforce
Investment Act and the federal pilot work-autho-
rization program were steps in that direction,
steps likely to be validated regardless of their actu-
al effects. As Moore remarked regarding the work-
authorization program, “It is almost a certainty
that no matter how big a failure this new system
proves to be, within ten years the registry will be
applied to all workers in the nation.”6 0Talismanic
objectives such as controlling illegal immigration,
enforcing child support obligations, and sup-
porting workforce investment continue to pro-
vide fertile ground for rationalizing increased
government surveillance of the employment and
whereabouts of every person in America.
Tracking Your Personal
Medical History:
The “Unique Health
Identifier”
Further jeopardizing our privacy and indi-
vidual autonomy is the 1996 federal mandate
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(discussed in Chapter 6) for a unique nation-
wide health identifier for each individual to
be used in standardized electronic databases
of personal medical information. Federal
officials are quick to point out that they are
not planning a single national database of
such information. But what they do intend is
to create the functional equivalent of such a
database. Once the formats are standardized
and identifiers specified, they plan to link
and merge the databases virtually at will so as
to accomplish whatever degree of centraliza-
tion of personal medical information the
government desires. Indeed, a federal report
entitled “Toward a National Health
Information Infrastructure” so stated, not-
ing that “[c]urrently, health information is
stored in many locations,” but the “NHII
[National Health Information Infrastruc-
ture] seeks to connect that information
where links are appropriate, authorized by
law and patient permissions, and protected
by security policies and mechanisms.”6 1 As
we saw in Chapter 6, the central government
used similar language in HIPAA privacy regu-
lations that actually reduced privacy—autho-
rizing broad access to medical records by gov-
ernment agencies without patient consent
and permitting consent to be coercively
obtained. Make no mistake about it: despite
the comforting tone of the bureaucratic lan-
guage, under the HIPAA-spawned regula-
tions it is the federal government that hence-
forth will determine what medical data
exchanges are considered “appropriate,”
what exchanges are “authorized by law,”
what constitutes patient “consent,” and what
“security” policies will be deemed sufficient. 
People familiar with HIPAA’s encroach-
ments find few words strong enough to
impart the magnitude of the threat to per-
sonal privacy involved. Forbes editor-in-chief
Steve Forbes described it as a “breathtaking
assault on the sanctity of your medical
records”; Newsweek’s writers described the
“big, ugly fact” that under HIPAA “every
detail of your medical profile may well land
in this new system without your consent,”
explaining that the new national databank
will allow “[a]nyone who knows your special
health-care number” to be “privy to some of
your most closely guarded secrets.”62
Despite such outcries, even today neither
the public nor the media have fully awakened
to the scope of HIPAA. When the New York
Times on July 20, 1998, ran a front-page story
entitled “Health Identifier For All Americans
Runs Into Hurdles,” the nearly two-year-old
fact that such a unique health identifier was
mandated by statutory law was described
elsewhere in the media as breaking news.
Depicting the Clinton administration as
“quietly laying plans to assign every
American a ‘unique health identifier,’” the
Times described the identifier as a “computer
code that could be used to create a national
database that would track every citizen’s
medical history from cradle to grave.” 
Meanwhile the federal bureaucracy pro-
ceeded systematically to carry out its statuto-
ry duty to select a health identifier. Yet even
as HHS was developing a “White Paper” sug-
gesting alternative ways of implementing the
identifier, the administration tried to soothe
the public by falsely asserting a personal
“confidentiality right,” a “‘right to communi-
cate with health care providers in confidence
and to have the confidentiality of the indi-
vidually identifiable health care information
protected,’” as proclaimed in November 1997
by the President’s Quality Commission. Of
course, no one knowledgeable of HIPAA’s
electronic database and health identifier pro-
visions had objective grounds for believing
such rights to be secure under existing statu-
tory law. Indeed, HHS itself stated in 1998
that the President’s Quality Commission and
the HHS secretary already had “recognized
that we must take care not to draw the
boundaries of the health care system and per-
missible uses of the unique identifier too nar-
rowly.”64 Given the predilections of federal
officials and the proposals at hand, the prob-
lem is quite the opposite.
On July 2, 1998, HHS released its lengthy
White Paper entitled “Unique Health
Identifier for Individuals.” In this chilling
document HHS calmly discussed exactly
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what Orwellian form the “unique health
identifier” would take and what degree of
encroachment on individual privacy would
be compelled. Along with other proposals,
HHS considered the following alternatives,
suggested by the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI), as “candidate
identifiers”: 
• Social Security number (SSN), including
the proposal of the Computer-based
Personal Record Institute (CPRI);
• Biometric identifiers;
• Directory service;
• Personal immutable properties;
• Patient identification system based on
existing medical record number and
practitioner prefix;
• Public key-private key cryptography
method; and a sample
• Universal Healthcare Identifier (UHID)
developed by the American Society for
Testing and Materials (ASTM).
In evaluating these and other proposals, HHS
grouped them into four categories: those
based on the SSN, those not based on the
SSN, those that don’t require a “universal,
unique identifier,” and hybrid proposals.
Despite the range of alternatives, HHS noted
that “Many of the proposals involve either the
SSN, SSA’s enumeration process [including its
“Enumeration at Birth” process], or both.” 
The federal drive to link birth and death
records with SSNs seen elsewhere also
recurred here, in this case augmented by link-
age to the health identifier. Noting that all
SSN-dependent proposals would “benefit
from further improvements in the process
for issuing and maintaining both SSNs and
birth certificates,” the HHS document sug-
gested that an “improved process could
begin with a newborn patient in the birth
hospital” where “at once the proper authori-
ties would assign a birth certificate number,
assign an SSN, and assign the health identifi-
er.”6 5 That goal echoes throughout today’s
multifaceted federal data-collection efforts.
In considering SSN-based health identi-
fiers, HHS listed as a positive aspect of the
unenhanced SSN that it “is the current de
facto identifier” and that people “are accus-
tomed to using their SSN as an identifier”
and “would not be required to adjust to
change.” One alternative proposal would add
to the SSN a “check digit” for fraud control.
Another would “use the SSN as the health
identifier for those individuals to whom it is
acceptable, but offer an alternative identifier
to others.” From a political transaction-cost
manipulation perspective that proposal
holds appeal, for it would give the appear-
ance of individual control without the reality.
(Does anyone think that there wouldn’t be a
data table linking the SSN and the “alterna-
tive” identifier?) Amazingly, listed among
potential negative aspects of this proposal
was the fact that a “potential stigma could be
attached to the alternate identifier” since “a
request for the identifier might be interpret-
ed to mean that the individual has some-
thing to hide”! HHS also was troubled by
this proposal because of the department’s
“anticipat[ion] that, given the choice, signifi-
cant numbers of individuals would request
the alternate identifier.” 
Equally stunning were proposals to
require biometric identifiers as the unique
health identifier. The HHS White Paper
described biometric identifiers as “based on
unique physical attributes, including finger-
prints, retinal pattern analysis, iris scan, voice
pattern identification, and DNA analysis.”
Listed negative aspects of this alternative
were chiefly mechanical obstacles—the fact
that there is now “no infrastructure” to sup-
port such identifiers, that the necessary “spe-
cial equipment” would “add to the cost” of
this alternative, and the like.6 7 Cost and
equipment issues thus were set against the
benefit of “uniqueness” that this alternative
would provide. Only the fact that biometric
identifiers are already used in law enforce-
ment and judicial proceedings prompted
HHS to state that their usage in health care
might make it “difficult to prevent linkages
that would be punitive or would compromise
patient privacy.” No mention was made of
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loss of liberty or threat of a police state,
unless that was what was meant by “linkages
that would be punitive.”
In addition to biometric identifiers,
another proposal in the group not based on
SSNs was a “civil registration system.” Such a
system would “use records established in the
current system of civil registration as the
basis to assign a unique, unchanging 16-posi-
tion randomly-generated (in base 10 or base
16) identifier for each individual.” This iden-
tifier “would link the lifetime records of an
individual’s human services and medical
records” and “track these and other encoun-
ters with the civil system,” including “state
birth files,” visas, “SSA records and military
identification,” and “library card and mem-
bership in civil organizations, etc.”6 8Doesn’t
anyone wonder why the central government
would like to keep track of information
about our library cards and membership in
civil organizations? HHS noted that
although such a system “meets the require-
ment of HIPAA for a standard, unique health
identifier for each individual,” it “would be
likely to raise very strong privacy objections.”
Evidently, from HHS’s perspective, the pub-
lic’s “strong privacy objections” are the only
barrier to police state methods.
A hybrid proposal that elicited strong
HHS support was called “Universal
Healthcare Identifier/Social Security Admin-
istration” (UHID/SSA). The UHID is an
identifier up to 29 characters long, including
a 16-digit sequential number, some check
digits, and an “encryption scheme identifier.”
HHS noted that the UHID/SSA proposal, by
selecting the SSA as a “trusted authority” to
maintain the system, “echoes the call for
improvements to the birth certificate process
to ensure reliable issuance of SSNs and
UHIDs at birth.” The SSA would issue the
UHID with each new SSN, and those with-
out SSNs “would be issued UHIDs as they
generate their first encounter with the health
system.” Although the UHID would not
appear on the Social Security card, the “SSA
would maintain the database linking the
SSN with the health identifier for its internal
verification process, but other unauthorized
users would be prohibited from linking the
two numbers.” In conjunction with the
UHID/SSA proposal, HHS praised the SSA
as an “experienced public program with a
national identification system that includes
most U.S. citizens and with the infrastruc-
ture necessary to issue and maintain the
health care identifier.” HHS stated that
selecting the SSA “as the responsible author-
ity for assigning the health care identifier
builds on the present infrastructure for issu-
ing SSNs” and would allow us to “restrict the
identifier to health care uses that can be pro-
tected with legislation or regulation.”6 9
There was more, including some less intrusive
measures, but these excerpts convey the spirit of
this shocking document. In late July 1998, after the
New York Times story publicized the issue, executive
branch officials took steps to distance themselves
from the unique health identifier. It was a remark-
able display, given that the statutory provisions—
including the lack of privacy restrictions—were
Clinton administration creations. Nonetheless, on
July 31 Vice President Al Gore ceremoniously pro-
claimed a new White House commitment to a
multifaceted “Electronic Bill of Rights,” which
included, among many other things, restrictions
on dissemination of people’s medical records.
Bowing to public pressure, the vice president said
that the administration would not proceed with
the unique health identifier until Congress passed
appropriate privacy legislation.70
Soon thereafter, in fall 1998, Congress
specifically prohibited HHS from spending
money on developing a unique health identifi-
er for individuals, initiating a moratorium
that has been renewed annually. Nevertheless,
HIPAA’s statutory mandate was not repealed.
The relevant language remains unequivocal,
stating that the “Secretary shall adopt stan-
dards providing for a standard unique health
identifier for each individual . . . for use in the
health care system” and “shall adopt security
standards” and standards to enable electronic
exchange of health information.71
With a final HHS medical privacy rule
now in place, Congress is well positioned to
permit a unique health identifier standard to
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be promulgated. After all, few have noticed
that the much ballyhooed “privacy” rule
actually reduces our privacy, permitting
widespread dissemination of our personal
medical records without our consent (as
described in Chapter 6). The dominant mes-
sage issuing from government officials and
the popular press has been: relax; we have a
privacy rule; no more need to worry! In this
political context, politicians who support the
federal powers granted by HIPAA possess the
perfect transaction-cost-manipulating ratio-
nale for proceeding with the unique identi-
fiers, no matter what the eventual conse-
quences regarding our medical privacy. 
One thing is clear: unless the relevant
HIPAA provision is repealed, sooner or later
the new health identifiers will become a real-
ity. Under HIPAA, it is the law. Moreover,
even if HIPAA’s unique health identifier pro-
vision were repealed, our omnipresent Social
Security numbers would serve the same func-
tion. In light of the 1998 HHS White Paper,
the real question is how intrusive the identi-
fiers will be. Other key rules, including the
HHS “Standards for Electronic
Transactions” discussed in Chapter 6, already
have been promulgated to implement the
uniform electronic databases of personal
medical information and widespread data
exchanges envisioned by HIPAA. The data-
bases are under construction. 
Once this medical information is assem-
bled, its likely uses and constituencies will
multiply. As early as June 1997, Newsweek
reported that “[o]rganizations clamoring for
unfettered access to the databank include
insurers, self-insured employers, health
plans, drugstores, biotech companies and
law-enforcement agencies.” Moreover, as
with the U.S. Census, pressure will material-
ize to expand the centralized information’s
scope. By 1997 the National Committee on
Vital and Health Statistics already had “ten-
tatively recommended that this mother lode
of medical information be further augment-
ed by specifics on living arrangements,
schooling, gender and race.”72
The issue is not just privacy; it is govern-
ment power. Dr. Richard Sobel of Harvard
Law School understood this clearly.
Assessing the impact of the new national
database and unique health identifiers, he
stated: “What ID numbers do is centralize
power, and in a time when knowledge is
power, then centralized information is cen-
tralized power. I think people have a gut
sense that this is not a good idea.”7 3Whether
that “gut sense” will find effective political
voice is the troublesome question.
Tracking Your Child’s
Education: The “National
Center for Education
Statistics”
If centralized information is centralized
power, the information now being collected
about children’s educational performance is
especially disturbing. Today federal data col-
lection, its scope expanded by the 1994 edu-
cation acts, permeates our educational sys-
tem. As with medical and employment infor-
mation, here too individually identified
information is being centralized in cross-
linked electronic databases nationwide, and
we are again being asked to trust that it will
not be misused. 
Recent experience in Fairfax County,
Virginia, suggests what such legislation has
spawned. In January 1997 the Washington Post
reported several Fairfax County school board
members “challeng[ed] a planned $11 mil-
lion computer database that would let
schools compile electronic profiles of stu-
dents, including hundreds of pieces of infor-
mation on their personal and academic back-
grounds.” The database would “be used to
track students from pre-kindergarten
through high school” and “could include
information such as medical and dental his-
tories, records of behavioral problems, family
income and learning disabilities.” Fairfax was
“considering providing some of the data to a
nationwide student information network
run by the U.S. Department of Education,”
possibly making the database “compatible
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with a nationwide data-exchange program,
organized by the Department of Education,
that makes student information available to
other schools, universities, government agen-
cies and potential employers.”74
That nationwide data-exchange net-
work—orchestrated by the federal govern-
ment and extended through the 1994 educa-
tion acts—now is the lifeblood of centralized
data collection about American students and
preschoolers, creating vast and potentially ill-
protected computerized records about chil-
dren and families throughout America. The
data-exchange pathways are (perhaps inten-
tionally) complex, largely connected via the
Office of Educational Research and
Improvement within the U.S. Department of
Education (DOE).
That office, administered by the assistant
secretary for educational research and
improvement, stands at the apex of the data-
centralization hierarchy, broadly empowered
to “collect, analyze, and disseminate data
related to education” and charged with
“monitoring the state of education” in
America.7 5 Included within the Office of
Educational Research and Improvement are
• the National Center for Education
Statistics;
• five national research institutes;7 6
• the Office of Reform Assistance and
Dissemination;
• the National Educational Research
Policy and Priorities Board; and
• “such other units as the Secretary [of
Education] deems appropriate.”7 7
Horizontal data linkages between subordi-
nate units in this hierarchy are made explicit
by a statutory requirement that the Office of
Reform Assistance and Dissemination create
an “electronic network” linking most educa-
tion-related federal offices as well as “entities
engaged in research, development, dissemi-
nation, and technical assistance” through
grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements
with DOE.
The federal education network is further
required to be linked with and accessible to
other users such as state and local education
agencies, providing file transfer services and
allowing DOE to disseminate, among other
things, “data published by the National
Center for Education Statistics,” a directory
of “education-related electronic networks
and databases,” and “such other information
and resources” as DOE “considers useful and
appropriate.” Sixteen regional “educational
resources information center clearinghous-
es” support the data dissemination, along
with a National Library of Education intend-
ed to serve as a “one-stop information and
referral service” for all education-related
information produced by the federal govern-
ment.7 8 Through the School-to-Work Op-
portunities Act the Labor Department is
required to act jointly with DOE to “collect
and disseminate information” on topics that
include “research and evaluation conducted
concerning school-to-work activities” and
“skill certificates, skill standards, and related
assessment technologies.”79
A spider web of data exchange is the
planned outcome. But central to the entire
process is the National Center for Education
Statistics (the “National Center”). It is the
federal entity most directly and extensively
involved in receiving individually identifiable
information about American children and
their education.
The National Center has authority to
“collect, analyze, and disseminate statistics
and other information relating to education”
in the United States and elsewhere.8 0 It is
authorized to collect data on such things as
“student achievement,” the “incidence, fre-
quency, seriousness, and nature of violence
affecting students,” and, still more intrusive-
ly, “the social and economic status of chil-
dren.” The clear implication is that schools
will be required to obtain information from
children and their families on such topics. In
addition, to carry out the National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP),
the commissioner of education statistics is
authorized to “collect and report data . . . at
least once every two years, on students at ages
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9, 13, and 17 and in grades 4, 8, and 12 in
public and private schools.”81 States partici-
pating in the NAEP testing process thus gen-
erate additional individually identified stu-
dent information for the federal government. 
Making education data from diverse
sources dovetail at the national level is an
explicit federal objective. The commissioner
of education statistics is authorized to gath-
er information from “States, local education-
al agencies, public and private schools,
preschools, institutions of higher education,
libraries, administrators, teachers, students,
the general public,” and anyone else the com-
missioner “may consider appropriate”—
including other offices within DOE and
“other Federal departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities” (the IRS, SSA, and federal
health care database authorities come to
mind). To facilitate centralization of the
data, the commissioner is empowered to
establish “national cooperative education
statistics systems” with the states to produce
and maintain “comparable and uniform
information and data on elementary and sec-
ondary education, postsecondary education,
and libraries” throughout America.8 2
The scope of these databases is so large and
their information so personal that even Congress
understood the need to genuflect toward privacy
and confidentiality. Indeed, the education
statutes purport to protect individually identifi-
able information, directing the federal bureaucra-
cy to “develop and enforce” standards to “protect
the confidentiality of persons” in its data collec-
tion and publication process. Individually identi-
fiable information is said to be restricted to use
for statistical purposes only. In addition, the
NAEP provisions prohibit the commissioner of
education statistics from collecting data “not
directly related to the appraisal of educational
performance, achievement, and traditional
demographic reporting variables,” admonishing
the commissioner to insure that “all personally
identifiable information about students, their
educational performance, and their families” will
remain “confidential.”83
Unfortunately, such provisions do not
guarantee the security of personal informa-
tion. Aside from the possibility of illicit
breaches of confidentiality, specific statutory
exceptions to confidentiality requirements
threaten to undermine any such security. To
begin with, information about institutions
and organizations that receive federal grants
or contracts is not protected.84 Moreover, the
National Center’s records—“including infor-
mation identifying individuals”—are made
accessible to a bevy of federal officials and
their designees, including the U.S. comptroller
general, the director of the Congressional
Budget Office, and the librarian of Congress,
as well as the secretary of education, again
with the boilerplate admonition that individ-
ually identifiable information is to be used
only for statistical purposes.8 5 Separate DOE
privacy regulations also countenance myriad
disclosures without the consent of the subject
individuals, among them disclosures made for
“routine uses” (one of the major loopholes in
the 1974 federal Privacy Act discussed above)
and those made either to another government
agency “for a civil or criminal law enforcement
activity” or to Congress.86
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA) similarly fails to protect individu-
als effectively against disclosure of student
information to the federal government.
Although FERPA’s rules in general prevent edu-
cational agencies and institutions from disclos-
ing personal information about students with-
out their consent, FERPA explicitly permits
release of such information to authorized rep-
resentatives of the U.S. comptroller general, the
secretary of education, and state educational
authorities whenever individually identifiable
records are “necessary in connection with the
audit and evaluation of Federally-supported
education program[s], or in connection with
the enforcement of the Federal legal require-
ments” related to such programs. In other
words, FERPA simply does not protect us
against disclosure of student records to the fed-
eral government. Again federal bureaucrats are
admonished that, unless “collection of person-
ally identifiable information is specifically
authorized” by federal law, “any data collected
by such officials shall be protected in a manner
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which will not permit the personal identifica-
tion of students and their parents by other than
those officials, and such personally identifiable
data shall be destroyed when no longer needed”
for the above purposes.8 7How such destruction
could be enforced and electronic copies pre-
vented are unanswered—and unanswerable—
questions. The officials themselves have
unquestioned access to such personally identi-
fied information, without the subject individ-
ual’s consent. That much lawmakers intended.
But disclosures beyond those intended by
lawmakers also are inevitable. Together the
statutes have spawned huge databases con-
taining individually identifiable personal and
educational information, widely distributed,
whose use is supposed to be confined to “sta-
tistical” endeavors. The laws don’t block the
government’s collection of individually identi-
fiable information, only its use. The risk anal-
ogy cited earlier—giving a teenager keys to a
motorcycle, handing him a bottle of liquor,
and admonishing him not to drink and
drive—is applicable; once again we’re just “ask-
ing for trouble.” Even criminal penalties
authorized for individuals convicted of violat-
ing confidentiality provisions of these laws do
little to lessen legitimate privacy concerns.
By placing vast discretion regarding col-
lection and distribution of personal informa-
tion in the hands of federal officials, and by
largely preventing citizens from blocking
transfer of information to the central govern-
ment, these laws again subordinate privacy to
the imperative of federal prying into people’s
private lives. As Electronic Privacy
Information Center director Marc Rotenberg
remarked concerning compilation of data-
bases on students such as those proposed in
Fairfax County, “‘The privacy concerns are
really extraordinary.’”88
Tracking Your Bank
Account: The Bank Secrecy
Act and Its Progeny
Privacy in America is further jeopardized
by federal statutory law requiring banks and
other financial institutions to create perma-
nent records of each individual’s checks,
deposits, and other banking activities. Along
with the FDIC’s ill-fated proposal8 9 in
December 1998 to require banks to scruti-
nize every customer’s banking records for evi-
dence of “unusual” transactions—which in
effect would have mandated warrantless
searches of private financial records—the leg-
islation authorizing these intrusions and
U.S. Supreme Court cases upholding them
illuminate the tenuous status of privacy in
America today.
The pivotal legislation was the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970.9 0In the name of assem-
bling banking records with “a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory
investigations and proceedings,” Congress
empowered the secretary of the treasury to
require every federally insured bank to create:
1. a microfilm or other reproduction of
each check, draft, or similar instrument
drawn on it and presented to it for pay-
ment; and
2. a record of each check, draft, or simi-
lar instrument received by it for deposit
or collection, together with an identifi-
cation of the party for whose account it
is to be deposited or collected.9 1
That requirement entailed microfilm records
of every detail of each customer’s bank
account—each check, each deposit—with
each account identified by the holder’s Social
Security number.9 2 The statute authorized
similar record keeping to be required of unin-
sured institutions, including even credit card
companies.9 3 Putting further discretionary
power in the treasury secretary’s hands, the
simultaneously passed Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act required individ-
uals and financial institutions to report the
“payment, receipt, or transfer of United
States currency, or such other monetary
instruments as the Secretary may specify, in
such amounts, denominations, or both, or
under such circumstances, as the Secretary
shall by regulation prescribe.”9 4 What could
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not be learned about an individual from such
records?
Court challenges quickly arose. In 1974
the U.S. Supreme Court in California Bankers
Association v. Shultz upheld the constitutional-
ity of the record-keeping requirements of the
Bank Secrecy Act against challenges ground-
ed in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution.95 Although
the Court stated that the act did not abridge
any Fourth Amendment interest of the
banks against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Court explicitly reserved the
question of the Fourth Amendment rights of
banks’ customers if bank records were dis-
closed to the government as evidence
through compulsory legal process. The
Court stated that “[c]laims of depositors
against the compulsion by lawful process of
bank records involving the depositors’ own
transactions must wait until such process
issues.” Dissenting, Justice Thurgood
Marshall stated:
The plain fact of the matter is that the
Act’s recordkeeping requirement feeds
into a system of widespread informal
access to bank records by Government
agencies and law enforcement personnel.
If these customers’ Fourth Amendment
claims cannot be raised now, they cannot
be raised at all, for once recorded, their
checks will be readily accessible, without
judicial process and without any showing
of probable cause, to any of the several
agencies that presently have informal
access to bank records.9 6
Justice Marshall added that it was “ironic
that although the majority deems the bank
customers’ Fourth Amendment claims pre-
mature, it also intimates that once the bank
has made copies of a customer’s checks, the
customer no longer has standing to invoke
his Fourth Amendment rights when a
demand is made on the bank by the
Government for the records.” He called the
majority’s decision a “hollow charade”
whereby Fourth Amendment claims are to be
labeled premature until such time as they can
be deemed too late.9 7
Justice Marshall’s “hollow charade” assess-
ment was vindicated two years later by the
Court’s 1976 decision in United States v. Miller.9 8
Stating flatly that depositors have “no legiti-
mate ‘expectation of privacy’” in their bank
records, the Court there held that the “depos-
itor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed
by that person to the Government,” a conclu-
sion not altered by the fact that the Bank
Secrecy Act mandated creation of the
records.99 Accordingly, the Court held that a
depositor’s Fourth Amendment rights were
not abridged by the government’s acquisition
of account records from his banks as part of a
criminal prosecution, even if the subpoena for
the documents was defective.
The case was too much for even Congress
to stomach. In response to U.S. v. Miller,
Congress in 1978 passed the Right to
Financial Privacy Act (“Financial Privacy
Act”), attempting to restore some protection
of personal financial records in the wake of
the Bank Secrecy Act’s forced disclosures.1 0 0
The central idea of the Financial Privacy Act
was to prevent federal government authori-
ties from obtaining personal financial
records held by banking institutions unless
either the customer authorized the disclo-
sure or the bank was responding to a proper-
ly issued subpoena, administrative sum-
mons, search warrant, or “formal written
request” by a government authority.101
In broad outline, the act prohibits banks
from disclosing personal financial records
maintained pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act
unless the federal authority seeking those
records “certifies in writing to the financial
institution that it has complied” with the
Financial Privacy Act.102 That certification
may be based on any of the above rationales
including a federal official’s “formal written
request,” the lenient prerequisites for which
potentially undermine the statute’s core
objectives. Such a request requires mere gov-
ernment assertion that “there is reason to
believe that the records sought are relevant to
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a legitimate law enforcement inquiry,”
accompanied by government notification of
the bank customer at his last known address. 
But “law enforcement inquiry” is used as a
term of art in the statute. Defining it to
include any “official proceeding” inquiring
into a failure to comply with a “criminal or
civil statute or any regulation, rule, or order
issued pursuant thereto,” the statute explicit-
ly includes the broad sweep of federal regula-
tory matters and thereby radically expands
the bank records that can be targeted and
disclosed in the name of “law enforcement
inquiry.” Moreover, the notification require-
ment can be met by simply mailing a copy of
the request to the targeted bank customer
“on or before the date on which the request
was made to the financial institution.”
Unless the individual then takes specific
steps to resist the disclosure by filing and
substantiating a motion with a U.S. district
court within fourteen days after the request
was mailed (not received), the bank is permit-
ted to give the government the records it
wants. Once obtained by federal authorities,
the bank records can be shared with other
federal agencies or departments if the trans-
ferring entity certifies in writing that there is
“reason to believe that the records are rele-
vant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry
within the jurisdiction of the receiving
agency or department.”1 0 3 In light of such
procedural impediments to private resistance
and the magic words “law enforcement activ-
ity” that allow countless channels of federal
access to personal bank records, it is clear in
whose favor the deck is stacked.
Besides the looseness evident in these
statutory provisions, two other major prob-
lems pervade the Financial Privacy Act: its
specific exclusions and, more generally, the
unreliability of Congress as protector of
financial privacy. Sixteen listed “exceptions”
to the Financial Privacy Act allow govern-
ment authorities to avoid its provisions in a
wide variety of circumstances.104 In addition,
the act allows government authorities to
obtain emergency access to financial records
from banks and other financial institutions
in certain situations.105
These exceptions along with the porosity
of the statute’s strictures made the Financial
Privacy Act weak grounds for protection
from unwarranted federal scrutiny of our
personal bank transactions. Of course, that is
no surprise. We surely cannot expect federal
officials who still claim power to order third-
party microfilming of our personal banking
records to always show delicate restraint in
using them. Yet we continue to rely on
Congress—the very source of the initial priva-
cy breach—to formulate laws supposed to
protect our financial privacy.
It happened again in 1999 with passage of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.1 0 6 That act
repealed the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act and
loosened legal restrictions on banks’ ability
to engage in related endeavors such as securi-
ties transactions.107 Old barriers between
banking, insurance, and securities businesses
were removed. A vast array of financial ser-
vices thus could be provided by affiliated
companies, creating enormous potential eco-
nomic efficiencies.
Unfortunately, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act also created an enormous threat to the
privacy of personal information held by the
newly interlocked companies. To ease our
minds, the authors of the act mandated cer-
tain privacy procedures for affected financial
institutions, stating that it is “the policy of
the Congress that each financial institution
has an affirmative and continuing obligation
to respect the privacy of its customers and to
protect the security and confidentiality of
those customers’ non-public personal infor-
mation.”108 Despite those fine words, howev-
er, the privacy regulations again were stacked
against the actual preservation of privacy.
Consider first the pass-through of person-
al financial information to the government
permitted by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
After setting forth rules intended to limit
financial firms’ disclosure of personal infor-
mation to nonaffiliated third parties, the act
then listed numerous exceptions to those pri-
vacy rules, allowing extensive disclosure of
personally identifiable information, among
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them
• disclosures “to law enforcement agencies
(including a Federal functional regulator,
the Secretary of the Treasury . . ., a State
insurance authority, or the Federal Trade
Commission), self-regulatory organiza-
tions, or for an investigation on a matter
related to public safety”; and 
• disclosures “to comply with Federal,
State, or local laws, rules, and other
applicable legal requirements; to comply
with a properly authorized civil, crimi-
nal, or regulatory investigation or sub-
poena or summons by Federal, State, or
local authorities; or to respond to judi-
cial process or government regulatory
authorities having jurisdiction over the
financial institution for examination,
compliance, or other purposes as autho-
rized by law.”109
In other words, having facilitated much
broader integration of personal data by
financial firms, Congress immediately made
provision for the federal government and
state governments to get their hands on it. 
It is therefore not surprising that the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s restraints on
financial firms also were structured to make
sure that lots of personal data would be
shared. The act requires financial institu-
tions to notify customers periodically of the
institution’s disclosure and privacy policies
regarding affiliated as well as nonaffiliated
parties. With respect to nonaffiliated third
parties, however, the main restraint on dis-
closure was structured as an “opt out” provi-
sion that requires a financial institution to
send customers a notice (a) describing the
disclosures of their personal information
that the firm may make to nonaffiliated
third parties, and (b) specifying to whom the
customer should write to prevent such dis-
closure.110 If the customer fails to communi-
cate his objection to the disclosure, the dis-
closure can legally occur. That is why we have
been receiving all those little “Our Privacy
Policies” pamphlets with all that little tiny
print. Among those who would prefer not to
have personal information about themselves
shared with nonaffiliated companies, how
many do you suppose take the time to read
and respond to each of those little pam-
phlets? And how many would consent if the
pamphlets instead asked for our actual per-
mission to disclose that personal informa-
tion about us? Of course, Congress under-
stands these realities as well as we do.
As obliging Congresses continue to cob-
ble together loose statutes such as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley privacy provisions and
the Financial Privacy Act, we now know that
even such porous protections could be with-
drawn, our financial privacy utterly
destroyed, without constitutional objection
from the U.S. Supreme Court. In such cir-
cumstances, congressional architects of the
nationwide structure of financial records
now threatening our privacy are unlikely to
provide reliable protection.
Government As Privacy
Protector?
In 1974 Congress passed the omnibus
Privacy Act, cited earlier in this chapter, to
regulate disclosure of personal information
by federal agencies. Even that long ago
Congress recognized the damage that federal
record keeping and disclosure could do, as
lawmakers made explicit in the “findings”
accompanying the act:
1. the privacy of an individual is directly
affected by the collection, mainte-
nance, use, and dissemination of per-
sonal information by Federal agencies;
2. the increasing use of computers and
sophisticated information technology,
while essential to the efficient opera-
tions of the Government, has greatly
magnified the harm to individual priva-
cy that can occur from any collection,
maintenance, use, or dissemination of
personal information;
3. the opportunities for an individual
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to secure employment, insurance,
and credit, and his right to due
process, and other legal protections
are endangered by the misuse of cer-
tain information systems;
4. the right to privacy is a personal and
fundamental right protected by the
Constitution of the United States;
and
5. in order to protect the privacy of indi-
viduals identified in information sys-
tems maintained by Federal agencies,
it is necessary and proper for the
Congress to regulate the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination
of information by such agencies.111
Despite that clear acknowledgement of the
federal threat to personal privacy, the 1974
Privacy Act112—riddled with exceptions and
counterbalanced by disclosure mandates in
the Freedom of Information Act —failed to
fulfill the promise these declarations seemed
to hold. The Electronic Frontier Foundation
was unequivocal in its 1994 assessment, stat-
ing that in meritorious cases “it is extremely
difficult for individuals to obtain relief under
the . . . Privacy Act” and calling the Act’s bias
in favor of government record keepers “one
of the most ugly faces of privacy.”113
No stronger proof of the act’s failure
could be given than the fact that all of the
privacy-destroying measures discussed in
this chapter were initiated or sustained after
the Privacy Act’s adoption and are deemed
compatible with its mandates. The federally
required expansion of use of Social Security
numbers, the federal databases of “new
hires,” the employment-authorization data-
bases, the federal mandates for uniform elec-
tronic databases of personal health informa-
tion and “unique health identifiers,” the
expanded federal collection of individually
identified educational information, the con-
tinued federal requirement that financial
institutions microfilm our checks and
deposits in case the federal government
desires to examine them—all of these now
coexist with a law ostensibly assuring our pri-
vacy vis-à-vis federal government “collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination” of per-
sonal information.
In 1988, as people became increasingly
alarmed about government centralization of
personal information, Congress purportedly
sought to strengthen the Privacy Act by adding
the Computer Matching and Privacy
Protection Act.114 Again, however, the statutory
privacy protections amounted to less than met
the eye, creating procedural hurdles rather than
firm obstacles to database matching. The 1988
act continued to allow such exchanges provid-
ed that the “computer matching program” was
“pursuant to a written agreement between the
source agency and the recipient agency” that
met specified procedural requirements. Federal
database-matching activities through the “new
hires” database, pilot programs for work autho-
rization, child support enforcement programs,
and other programs confirm that this act pro-
vided scant impediment to the continuing fed-
eral data quest. As noted earlier, some forty-
seven instances of federal database exchanges
involving personal information about
Americans occurred pursuant to this statute
within a recent eighteen-month period alone.
Based on this and other evidence, Privacilla.org
concluded in its 2001 report that the Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act, by “regu-
larizing transfer of citizen data among federal
agencies,” in reality “sanctions and contributes
to the federal government’s threat to priva-
cy.”115 Openly acknowledging such ongoing
federal data-sharing activity—indeed bragging
about it—a government report published in
1998 reassured citizens that their information-
collection burden is minimized because
“Agencies are working together to share infor-
mation across programs so that people only
need respond to a single collection from one
agency rather than multiple collections from
many agencies.”116
Today, federally required databases of per-
sonal information continue to proliferate.
One measure of their current scope is that, in
the 2000 Code of Federal Regulations, the index
entry under the heading “Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements” by itself was
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sixty-four pages long! Moreover, the federal
government now reports an annual “infor-
mation collection budget” showing the num-
ber of hours acknowledged to be the central
government’s “information collection bur-
dens imposed on the public.” For fiscal year
2000 that document estimated
7,447,200,000 hours—over seven billion
hours—as the time cost of the information
collection burden imposed on private citi-
zens by federal departments and agencies.1 1 7
That is equivalent to forcing over three and a
half million private individuals to work full
time at uncompensated labor for the entire
year just to gather the data that the federal
government demands.
Information on such a scale would not be
collected unless federal officials regarded it as
instrumental in changing people’s behavior—
social behavior, economic behavior, political
behavior. And, of course, it is: collective out-
comes as well as actions by individuals can be
and are influenced by means of such pro-
grams. Far from innocuous, this data collec-
tion and the intensity of its pursuit reveal the
enormous value placed on such intelligence by
federal officials. Rep. Jim McDermott (D.,
Wash.), one of the few congressmen who
actively resisted HIPAA’s 1996 authorization
of uniform national electronic databases for
health care, later stated, “There is no privacy
anymore,” adding that “It has been eroded in
so many ways that you can find out almost
anything about anybody if you know how to
work the computer well enough.”1 1 8
Others cite the fundamental inconsisten-
cy between privacy and government. Noting
that “privacy is inconsistent with so much of
what government does,” a 2001 report pre-
pared by Privacilla.org stated that “[e]ven the
best-intended government programs have as
part of their design the removal of citizens’
power over information about themselves,”
often making it “outright illegal for citizens
to protect their privacy.” The report conclud-
ed that “[w]hen government has collected
information from people under the authori-
ty of law, people’s ability to protect privacy in
that information is taken away.”119
Legislation aside, the personal behavior of
government officials offers little hope that
they can be trusted to behave ethically with
respect to the personal data now at their fin-
gertips. Republicans and Democrats alike
succumb to temptation when the stakes are
perceived to be high enough. Republican
President Richard Nixon in 1971 expressed
his intention to select as IRS commissioner
“a ruthless son of a bitch,” who “will do what
he’s told,” will make sure that “every income
tax return I want to see I see,” and “will go
after our enemies and not go after our
friends.”1 2 0 It was widely reported that
Democratic President Bill Clinton, for simi-
lar reasons, apparently sanctioned the illegal
transfer of more than nine hundred FBI files
to the White House. And, ironically, federal
agencies such as the IRS routinely have used
privacy legislation to shield evidence of their
own misdeeds.121 Does anyone contemplat-
ing today’s ubiquitous federal collection of
personal data still imagine that political lead-
ers cannot and will not abuse this system for
their own ends? Each passing administration
demonstrates anew Dr. Sobel’s succinct
observation that “centralized information is
centralized power.”122
The converse is also true: with today’s
technology, centralized power is centralized
information. Substantive powers of govern-
ment spawn correlative record-keeping pow-
ers; as federal power grows, so does related
data collection. Personal freedom according-
ly gives ever more ground to expanding gov-
ernment responsibility. Given these
inevitable tendencies, Cato Institute policy
analyst Solveig Singleton proposed a better
way to protect privacy:
The better model for preserving privacy
rights and other freedoms in the U.S. is
to restrict the growth of government
power. As the federal government
becomes more entangled in the busi-
ness of health care, for example, it
demands greater access to medical
records. As tax rates grow higher and
the tax code more complex, the Internal
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Revenue Service claims more power to
conduct intrusive audits and trace cus-
tomer transactions. Only holding back
the power of government across the
board will safeguard privacy—and with-
out any loss of Americans’ freedom.1 2 3
Of course, the Founders tried to hold back
the power of government through the U.S.
Constitution. As author and critic H. L.
Mencken explained:
[Government] could do what it was
specifically authorized to do, but noth-
ing else. The Constitution was simply a
record specifying its bounds. The
fathers, taught by their own long
debates, knew that efforts would be
made, from time to time, to change the
Constitution as they had framed it, so
they made the process as difficult as
possible, and hoped that they had pre-
vented frequent resort to it. Unhappily,
they did not foresee the possibility of
making changes, not by formal act, but
by mere political intimidation—not by
recasting its terms, but by distorting its
meaning. If they were alive today, they
would be painfully aware of their over-
sight.1 2 4
As we have seen, this avoidance of the formal
amendment process has been an integral
part of the political transaction-cost manipu-
lation undergirding the twentieth-century
expansion of federal authority and the corre-
sponding erosion of individual liberty. 
Though fiercely concerned about privacy,
for decades Americans have allowed the jug-
gernaut of federal data collection to roll on,
unmindful of writer and editor A. J. Nock’s
insight that “whatever power you give the
State to do things for you carries with it the
equivalent power to do things to you.”1 2 5
Public passivity on this issue reflects the
usual politico-economic forces, central
among them high costs of resistance exacer-
bated by federal officials’ manipulation of
political transaction costs. As we have seen, in
repeated instances privacy-jeopardizing pro-
visions have been hidden in omnibus bills
hundreds of pages long, making it difficult
for lawmakers, let alone citizens, to see them
and react before they become law.
Misinformation has also helped, especially
when uncritically repeated by the media—the
appealing justifications, the ignored data-
collection authority. In the case of HIPAA,
despite outspoken efforts in 1996 by
Representative McDermott and several other
legislators to publicize the extraordinary
threat to privacy contained in the provisions
for uniform electronic databases and unique
health identifiers, neither Congress nor the
media spread the story. Although some did-
n’t know, some definitely did. Yet, two years
later, face-saving untruths or careless report-
ing further obscured the events of 1996.
When the “unique health identifier” story
was reported in 1998 as breaking news, the
Associated Press, for instance, uncritically
reiterated statements attributed to an
unnamed “Republican congressional aide”
claiming that “[m]embers of Congress did
not recognize the privacy implications of
what they had done until media reports
about the issue came out this week.”1 2 6
Thus instituted, the federal data-collec-
tion programs described in this chapter now
themselves serve as instruments of political
transaction-cost augmentation. Their effect
in raising the cost to individuals of resisting
intrusive government power is evident. How
might an individual even resist federal infor-
mation collection about himself? With data
largely collected by third parties and trans-
ferred to the central government without the
subject individual’s consent, personal infor-
mation is now collected whenever an individ-
ual touches the fabric of society in almost
any way: getting a job, seeking medical care,
attending school, maintaining a bank
account. Will not fear of government misuse
of such personal information inevitably
mold a more compliant citizenry?
Many who prize liberty and privacy—so eas-
ily assuaged, so vulnerable to political transac-
tion-cost manipulation—were, in late 1998,
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cheerfully celebrating a spurious victory
regarding the unique health identifier, appar-
ently comforted by Vice President Al Gore’s
commitment to an “Electronic Privacy Act.”
But the vice president’s own press release,
though it noted a raft of new controls the
administration wanted to place on private
businesses’ use of personal information, was
nearly silent regarding government use of per-
sonal information, stating only an intention
to “launch a ‘privacy dialogue’ with state and
local governments” that would include “con-
sidering the appropriate balance between the
privacy of personal information collected by
governments, the right of individuals to access
public records, and First Amendment val-
ues.”1 2 7With existing statutes and regulations
usurping personal privacy more aggressively
with each passing day, it is much too late for a
bureaucratic “privacy dialogue.”
And the federal government keeps push-
ing. On July 28, 1999, a news story titled
“U.S. Drawing Plan That Will Monitor
Computer Systems” ran on the front page of
the New York Times. The report revealed a fed-
eral government proposal to establish a com-
puter monitoring system “overseen” by the
FBI that, among other things, would scruti-
nize private e-mail communications between
individuals not suspected of any wrongdo-
ing. The ostensible rationale for monitoring
such private communication was “anti-ter-
rorism” and protection against “intruders”
attacking government computers. Reporter
John Markoff summarized the proposal as
follows:
[The draft plan] calls for a sophisticated
software system to monitor activities
on nonmilitary Government networks
and a separate system to track networks
used in crucial industries like banking,
telecommunications and transporta-
tion. . . . As part of the plan, networks of
thousands of software monitoring pro-
grams would constantly track comput-
er activities looking for indications of
computer network intrusions and
other illegal acts. The plan calls for the
creation of a Federal Intrusion
Detection Network, or Fidnet, and
specifies that the data it collects will be
gathered at the National Infrastructure
Protection Center, an interagency task
force housed at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. . . . The plan focuses on
monitoring data flowing over Govern-
ment and national computer networks.
That means the systems would poten-
tially have access to computer-to-com-
puter communications like electronic
mail and other documents, computer
programs and remote log-ins.1 2 8
Civil liberties groups expressed their strong
opposition to the proposal, likening the plan
“to a computerized version of a random
search.”129 James Dempsey, a staff lawyer for
the Center for Democracy and Technology,
said that the plan “involves monitoring all
legitimate communications in order to identi-
fy the few unauthorized communications . . . a
potential civil-liberties nightmare.”130
The invasive statutes and regulations
described in this chapter have brought us to
this point. The government data collection
now authorized would have seemed unimag-
inable in an America whose citizens once
boldly and meaningfully proclaimed individ-
ual liberty. What important personal infor-
mation is not now at the fingertips of curious
federal officials? Whatever does remain pri-
vate is increasingly vulnerable to proposals
such as the one just described. And the
future? Centralized power is centralized
information; centralized information is cen-
tralized power. The usual consequences are
well known: “As history has shown, the col-
lection of information can have a negative
effect on the human ability to make free
choices about personal and political self-gov-
ernance. Totalitarian regimes have already
demonstrated how individuals can be ren-
dered helpless by uncertainty about official
use of personal information.”1 3 1
Reducing central government power is the
only alternative to such dependence. As gov-
ernment data mandates proliferate and
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encryption issues loom larger, those who cling
to government as privacy’s bulwark may well
reflect on Electronic Frontier Foundation
cofounder John Perry Barlow’s statement that
“[t]rusting the government with your privacy
is like having a peeping Tom install your win-
dow blinds.”132 In assessing the privacy impli-
cations of the mandated unique health identi-
fiers and uniform electronic databases of per-
sonal medical information, physician
Bernadine Healy was succinct: “Government
does a lot of things well, but keeping secrets is
not one of them.”133
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